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Abstract
Many factors contribute to choice of employment other than compensation. This study extends the cur-
rent hteralure by testing whether a compensating differential exists in employment sectors deemed
morally satisfying. Data from the 1998 salary survey ofthe National Association for Business Econom-
ics (NABE) and sector rankings addressing moral satisfaction provided by a sample of college students
are used in a regression analysis. When we include a self selection correction in the salary regression,
business economists in the for-profit sector earned almost 150 percent more than their nonprofit coun-
terparts, once controlling for the choice of employment sector and human capital variables. Average
wages were economically and statistically higher for business economists situated in the middle and low
moral satisfaction groupings compared to those in the high moral satisfaction sector. Results suggest a
compensating differential for those employed in morally satisfying industry sectors.
I. Introduction
In every first economics course, students are
exposed to a simple optimization model to explain
and predict economic behavior. The model assumes
that rational, self-interested actors with access to
perfect infonnation maximize utility, in the case of
consumers, or profit.s, in the case of firms. In more
advanced models, economists include desires for
social goals in the utility function in order to
explain actions that, on the surface, appear contrary
to the assumption of rational self-interest. There-
fore, the individual who gives dollars to charity,
donates time to a soup kitchen, or provides aid to
someone in distress, does so because these actions
are part of a utility set lo be maximized.
In the labor economics field, the study of
unselfish behavior has been examined in the context
of a tradeoff between pecuniary benefits and a sense
of moral satisfaction. Economists tell a compensat-
ing wage differential story and examine the tradeoff
in choosing nonprofit employment (Weisbrod 1983;
Handy and Katz 1998) or employment deemed
morally satisfying (Frank 1996). The present study
extends the current literature by testing whether a
compensating differential exists for business econo-
mists. Using data from the 1998 salary survey ofthe
National Association for Business Economics
(NABE), a professional trade association consisting
of economists employed in academic, govemtnen-
tal, and private sector positions, we use regression
analysis to test whether business economists expe-
rience a compensating differential for employment
perceived as morally satisfying.
The examination of a wage-moral satisfaction
tradeoff is not easy for several reasons. First, it may
be that individuals who choo.se employment that
provides a sense of moral satisfaction may base
their selection on a limited set of career opportuni-
ties. That is, some individuals choose employment
we identify as "tnorally satisfying" either because
of preferences toward morally satisfying work or
because they have limited employment opportuni-
ties. This problem results in self-selection bias,
which has been studied by John H. Goddeeris
(1988) in the cotitext of public sector lawyers. Sec-
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ond, the term "moral satisfaction" is ambiguous and
is often arbitrarily defined by the researcher.
Despite these problems, our study brings to light
new information on the wage-moral satisfaction
tradeoff. We examine the self-selection issues
empirically and vary the definition of moral satis-
faction to find both are important elements in con-
sideration of the wage-moral satisfaction tradeoff.
II. Hedonic Wage Theory and Moral
Satisfaction
A. Hedonic Wage Theory and Moral
Satisfaction
Economists explain wage differentials as a result
of productivity differences, market power, discrim-
ination, market factors, and preferences for particu-
lar employment characteristics. Economic theory
uses utility maximizing outcomes as a means of
revealing preferences. Thus, for example, when an
individual is willing to accept a lower salary for a
benefit such as low risk, the resulting combination
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits reveals the
individual's preference for safety. In other words,
the actual selection of an occupation and an
employer will be infiuenced by individual tastes
and preferences for various employment character-
istics.
Hedonic wage theory examines how the tradeoff
between wages and other benefits leads to matches
between employees, who maximize utility, and
employers, who maximize profits. In the context of
our study, we assume that wages and moral satis-
faction are goods to be traded: if one desires moral-
ly satisfying employment, then that individual
would be willing to trade wages for the benefit. As
depicted in Figure 1, Individual 1 is just such a per-
son (Indifference Curve I,). Individuals 2 & 3 prefer
higher wages and relatively less moral satisfaction.
Individuals are matched to the sectors with the com-
bination of wages and moral satisfaction that allow
the individuals the highest level of utility.
Hedonic wage theory assumes that firms operate
at zero economic profits due to the assumption of
perfect competition. The concave shape of the iso-
profit curves represents the diminishing marginal
retums to providing moral satisfaction. As with
many benefits, firms incur increasing costs with
provision of additional moral satisfaction. Moral
satisfaction choices likely drive costs upward as the
firm's options to make marginal improvements
decline. For example, since the introduction of
managed care, many nurses and doctors have
expressed frustration with the limitations imposed
on them as heath care providers. In order to control
costs, managed care firms may choose to limit the
number of tests that may be performed by a physi-
cian, may increase the ratio of patients per nurse, or
limit the number of days in a hospital. For some
healthcare providers, these constraints are morally
challenging and, as such, may lead to some doctors
and nurses choosing a lower paying position with a
firm that is less limiting. Accordingly, if the man-
aged care provider offered greater moral satisfac-
tion to these workers, it would require a greater cost
to the firm.
We examine how individuals match to sectors
that may yield different levels of moral satisfaction.
In Figure 1, Sector 1 has relatively low wages, but
provides employment with high levels of moral sat-
isfaction, as denoted by the sector's isoprofit curve
{S|); Sectors 2 & 3 offer relatively high wages but
less sense of moral satisfaction {S, & S,). Sectors 2
& 3 fmd it relatively costly to promote moral satis-
faction (e.g., a securities dealer needs highly com-
petitive brokers who can sell the featured financial
products regardless of the social good). Sector 1
firms may be able to promote moral satisfaction at
low cost due to their very nature (e.g., employment
that improves the living conditions of the poor, dis-
advantaged, or exploited) or because the sector can-
not provide high wages and therefore promotes
moral satisfaction to offset superior monetary
rewards of the private sector (greater variety and
challenge). Ultimately, the sectors and individuals
achieve their maximizing goals where profits and
utility are maximized, given the constraint of the
matching process.
If Figure 1 included an infinite number of sectors
and workers involved in the matching process
described above, an equilibrium market locus, or
the hedonic price equation (HPE), results. TTie HPE
represents the feasible offers firms can extend and
employees are willing to accept. In other words, the
HPE presents the combination of wages and moral
satisfaction that allows employees choices in terms
of their preferences and strengths.
Consistent with previous studies (Wesbrod 1983,
Goddeeris 1988) that test for a compensating differ-
ential among lawyers choosing between private sec-
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FIGURE 1. The Wage-Moral Satisfaction Tradeoff
tor and public sector employment, we have decided
to focus on industry sector as opposed to occupa-
tion as a means of testing moral satisfaction and a
possible compensating differential. Our study bene-
fits from analysis of sector choice. The survey
respondents are business economists whose actual
employment duties vary. The set of respondents is
fairiy homogeneous in terms of training and educa-
tion, particularly when compared to other studies,
such as Frank (1996), who uses graduating seniors
from Cornell. We consider the perception of moral
satisfaction for industry sectors, such as "Financial
Institutions" and "Government," as opposed to
occupational choices of "Banker" and "Bureau-
crat." Sector comparison may be more viable in this
case because occupational comparisons are certain-
ly limited here.' Lawyers can work for the public
defender's office or Enron. Public relations profes-
sionals can put their knowledge, skills and abilities
lo work on behalf of a cause (e.g.. Cystic Fibrosis)
or they can work on behalf of Phillip Morris and
contribute to diffusion of life-threatening misinfor-
mation. Likewise, economists can be teachers who
analyze macro data or they can work for a cigarette
manufacturer and analyze macro data.
B. Empirical examinations of moral
satisfaction and wages
Empirical research on hedonic wage theory sup-
ports the notion that workers trade off some em-
ployment characteristics for wages. Rosen (1974)
presents evidence that individuals accept lower
wages for low-risk jobs.^ Montgomery et al. (1992)
find a compensating wage differential for pensions
and Woodbury (1983) finds a tradeoff between
wages and fringe benefits. Evidence is weaker
regarding the tradeoff regarding other employment
attributes, such as longer work hours, unpleasant
working conditions, and commute from home
(Ehrenberg and Smith 2003).
While not specifically testing for a compensating
differential, Mirvis and Hackett (1983) examine
work characteristics of various sectors of employ-
ment. They consider the for-profit, government, and
nonprofit sectors. Their survey reveals that nonprof-
it workers eam lower salaries but find that their
employment offers more intrinsic rewards. These
workers are more committed to their work, finding
it to be more challenging, more autonomous, and
offering greater variety. These findings are similar
to those for government employees except govern-
ment employees report lower levels of autonomy
and infiuence in the workplace. This finding sug-
gests that workers may derive benefits from their
employment beyond monetary compensation.'
Several papers examine whether the public/pri-
vate sector choice represents a compensating differ-
ential. Handy and Katz (1998) present a theoretical
exposition of wage strategies used by nonprofits to
attract managers of high quality and high commit-
ment to the organization. The nonprofit's optimal
strategy is to offer lower wages than the private sec-
tor so only those committed to the organization's
cause apply for the job. This strategy permits non-
profits to eliminate monitoring costs. Theoretically,
as long as the firm has perfect information about
individual ability, it can pay less for managers as
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capable as those in the private sector, but who pre-
fer the employment characteristics or mission of the
nonprofit organization.'
Earlier empirical work examines the preference
for public sector employment. Weisbrod (1983)
uses a probahility model to examine the choice of
puhlic sector law over the private sector. Using data
on 790 lawyers, Weisbrod finds that as the gap
between the expected earnings between the private
and public sectors grows, the probability that an
individual will land in the private sector increases,
suggesting that different preferences among work-
ers in each sector exist. Survey responses in the
dataset conftrm that lawyers know about the pub-
lic/private sector salary gap. that the gap does not
narrow with time, and that the public sector lawyers
have no regrets about their choices even though
salaries are lower. Evidence suggests that the gap in
preferences may result from a socialization process
that occurs in law school (Stover 1989).
Goddeeris (1988) uses a sample from the same
lawyer dataset. but estimates a self-selection model
suggested by Heckman (1979) to estimate the com-
pensating differential for the choice of public sector
law. Like Weisbrod (1983). Goddeeris finds that an
increase of the potential earnings gap increases the
probability that an individual will choose the pri-
vate sector. Controlling for self-selection reduces
the coefficient related to the two sectors in the earn-
ings equation, but average salary differences are
still statistically and economically significant, sug-
gesting self-selection explains much but not the
entire differential between private and public sector
law.
Frank (1987) observes that the utility maximiza-
tion framework has proven helpful to economists in
understanding and predicting social phenomena
relating to economic behavior. However, he argues
that increased attention to the empirical specifica-
tion of the utility function can expand the useful-
ness of this framework. Two other studies support
the idea that specification of the utility function can
contribute greater understanding to compensating
wage differentials. Marsh and Stafford (1967)
examine how professional and intellectual attitudes
toward work affect compensation for technical and
professional workers in lhe United States. Using
regression analysis they find that academically
employed professional and technical workers
forego monetary retums relative to their nonacade-
mic, private industry, government and self-
employed counterparts. In a more recent study.
Frank (1996) asks the question. "Are people funda-
mentally selfish?" To answer his question, he exam-
ines wage differentials for evidence of people's
concern for others. His analysis indicates that moral
satisfaction as it relates to one's employment pro-
vides greater explanatory power regarding wage
differentials than do human capital or gender vari-
ables.
Frank's finding is intriguing and stimulates our
interest in further examination. Our study extends
the current literature by utilizing a dataset com-
prised of more experienced workers who have had
the opportunity to evaluate and act on the trade-off
between salary and moral satisfaction. TTie salary
data used by Frank (1996) comes from recent Cor-
nell University graduates from across disciplines at
the university. It is unlikely that recent college grad-
uates have had sufficient time and the necessary
exposure to evaluate fairly the trade-off between
moral satisfaction and salary. Accordingly, we
argue that our dataset consisting of more experi-
enced workers offers a richer source of information
regarding the employment decisions of individual
utility maximizing actors.
We can draw a second distinction between the
salary datasets. The NABE data reflect salaries of
individuals who for whatever reason now identify
themselves as business economists. Although edu-
cational attainment varies across the sample, the
interests and preferences of these individuals seem
to have converged in the general occupational cate-
gory of business economist. In contrast to the per-
ceived convergence of interests and preferences
among respondents to the NABE survey, the shared
identity of the Cornell alumni used in Frank (1996)
diverge at graduation. Accordingly, it is likely that
the variation in salary reported by the Cornell alum-
ni is attributable to preferences that are still forming
rather than matured as might be the case in an older,
more experienced sample of individuals who have
chosen to pursue a particular profession.
The preceding literature review suggests that
many factors other than compensation contribute to
employment sector choice. Nonetheless, the rela-
tionship between some of these variables and com-
pensation remains ambiguous. We follow Frank's
(1996) methodology but we use compensation data
of more experienced business economists compared
to Frank's study. In addition, ratings of moral satis-
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faction will be standardized to account for differ-
ences in variation among raters.^
III. Model and Data Description.
The National Association for Business Econom-
ics (NABH) conducts a biennial survey of members.
We use the 1998 Salary Characteristics Survey from
NABE. The original sample consists of 771
retumed surveys representing a response rate of
30.7%. However, due to missing information on
some observations and our methodology for group-
ing employment sectors for part of the analysis, the
sample is reduced to 440 observations.''
The Basic Model
Because the focus of the paper is the HPE and
not the structural prices implied by the hedonic
price theory, we use a reduced form salary mode! to
capture differences in salaries by sectors.
Ln salary = 3^ +^ ^^MoralSatisfaction +
^firad. Deg.^ + ^ female^ + Xp.
Experience _ + 2 p Firmsiz + (1)
S p Occupational Activity .^-
X S Region + e
where the dependent variable is the natural log of
the base annual salary for individual /, Grad. Deg. is
a binary variable set equal to 1 if the individual has
at least a Master's degree.^ Female indicates the
respondent's gender, and 'E.xperience is a measure
of job tenure, using 9 categories of tenure (experi-
ence less than two years is the benchmark catego-
ry). Firmsize is a measure of the size of a firm using
the number of employees of the firm to break the
firm size into two categories (firm size 1-249
employees is the benchmark category). Firmsize is
included to control for the observed positive corre-
lation between wages and the number of employees
in a firm (Mellow 1982; Schmidt and Zimmermarm
1991; Weiss 1966). Although studies attempt to
explain this statistical relationship, we are aware of
no definitive explanation for the positive correlation
(Brown and Medoff 1989; Dunn 1986). Activity
represents 15 different self-reported occupational
activities (listed in Table 2), Region represents four
regional categories (the South is the benchmark
case) and e is an error term. These independent
TABLE 1.
Sector Groupings
Researcher Defmition of Profit and
Nonprofit
Groupings Using Survey of Undergraduate Students and
Factor Analysis
Profit Nonprofit
Low Moral
Satisfaction
Medium Moral
Satisfaction
High Moral
Satisfaction
Finan. Inst. (93)
Sec.&Invest. (42)
Publishing (11)
Transportation (8)
Insurance (12)
Ret/Whole Trade (8)
Manufacturing (45)
N = 219
Academic (58)
Nonprft. Resch (15)
Govemment (110)
Trade Assns (38)
= 22I
Manufacturing (45)
RetAVhole Trade (8)
Transportation (8)
Trade Assns (38)
Finan. Inst (93)
Sec.&Invest. (42)
Insurance (12)
Govemment (110)
N = 257
Publishing (11)
Nonprft. Resrch (15)
Academic (58)
N = 84
The sector definitions are as delineated in the 1998 National Association for Business Economists Survey. Subsam-
ples are in parentheses.
Abbreviations:
Finan.Inst. = Financial Institutions
Sec. & Invest. = Securities and Investment
Ret.AVhole Trade = Retail and Wholesale Trade
Nonprft. Resch. = Nonprofit Research
Trade Assns = Trade Associations
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TABLE 2.
Descriptive Statistics—Salary Survey
Variable
Salary
Ln Salary
Education > 16
Experience < 2 Yrs.
Experience 2-4 Yrs.
Experience 5-9 Yrs.
Experience 10-14 Yrs.
Experience 15-19 Yrs.
Experience 20-24 Yrs.
Experience 25-29 Yrs.
Experience 30-34 Yrs.
Experience > 35 Yrs.
Consulting
Corporate Planning
Econometrics Statistics
Energy Economics
Financial analysis/planning
Financial Economics
General Admin/Mgt,
General Admin/Economics
Industrial Microeconomics
International Economics
Macro forecasting
Marketing Research
Regional Economics
Teaching
Entire Sample
90,929.30
(51,401.60)
11.296
(0.482)
0.505
(0.501)
0.020
(0.142)
0.168
(0.374)
0.141
(0.348)
0.159
(0.366)
0.205
(0.404)
0.118
(0.323)
0.061
(0.240)
0.061
(0.240)
0.048
(0.213)
0.030
(0.170)
0.045
(0.209)
0.066
(0.248)
0.027
(0.163)
0.084
(0.278)
0.086
(0.281)
0.043
(0.203)
0.055
(0.227)
0.061
(0.240)
0.055
(0.227)
0.073
(0.260)
0.045
(0.209)
0.082
(0.274)
0.091
(0.288)
For Profit
105,475.00
(61,183.0)
11.429
(0.498)
0.447
(0.498)
0.027
(0.164)
0.110
(0.313)
0.155
(0.363)
0.119
(0.324)
0.178
(0.383)
0.192
(0.395)
0.119
(0.050)
0.050
(0.219)
0.050
(0.219)
0.041
(0.199)
0.082
(0.275)
0.059
(0.237)
0.014
(0.117)
0.132
(0.340)
0.123
(0.330)
0.046
(0.209)
0.041
(0.199)
0.037
(0.188)
0.059
(0.237)
0.114
(0.319)
0.050
(0.219)
0.005
(0.068)
0.014
(0.117)
NonProtlt
76,514.80
(33,816.40)
11.164
(0.397)
0.561
(0.497)
0.014
(0.116)
0.050
(0.218)
0.181
(0.386)
0.163
(0.370)
0.140
(0.348)
0.217
(0.413)
0.118
(0.323)
0.072
(0.260)
0.045
(0.208)
0.018
(0.134)
0.009
(0.095)
0.072
(0.260)
0.041
(0.198)
0.036
(0.187)
0.050
(0.218)
0.047
(0.198)
0.068
(0.252)
0.086
(0.281)
0.050
(0.218)
0.032
(0.176)
0.041
(0.198)
0.149
(0.357)
0.177
(0.382)
T-stat
6.15*
4.41*
-1.76
0.71
1.71
-0.53
-0.98
-0.80
-0.49
0.03
-0.71
0.18
-0.459
1.05
2.75*
-0.41
-1.28
2.71*
2.04*
0.19
-0.91
-1.60
0.33
2.48*
0.35
-3.94*
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 2.
(Continued)
Variable
Other Activities
Gender (Female = 1)
Firmsize 1-249
Firmsize 250-4999
Firmsize > 5000
Profit (1 if work for profit org.)
Moral Satisfaction Low
Moral Satisfaction Medium
Moral Satisfaction High
Actual-Expected Salary
(Thousands of dollars)
North
South
Central
West
Sample Size
Entire Sample
0.189
(0.392)
0.136
(0.343)
0.209
(0.407)
0.189
(0.392)
0.602
(0.490)
0.498
(0.501)
0.225
(0.418)
0.584
(0.493)
0.191
(0.393)
-2.749
(50.604)
0.266
(0.442)
0.295
(0.457)
0.289
(0.454)
0.150
(0.357)
440
For Profit
0.005
(0.068)
0.150
(0.358)
0.247
(0.432)
0.320
(0.467)
0.434
(0.497)
0.671
(0.471)
0.279
(0.449)
0.050
(0.219)
18.807
(55.354)
0.365
(0.480)
0.215
(0.411)
0.324
(0.469)
0.105
(0.307)
219
Nonprofit
0.131
(0.338)
0.122
(0.328)
0.172
(0.378)
0.059
(0.236)
0.769
(0.422)
0.172
(0.378)
0.498
(0.501)
0.330
(0.471)
-24.111
(33.953)
0.172
(0.378)
0.376
(0.382)
0.376
(0.485)
0.253
(0.436)
221
T-stat
^ . 8 3 *
0.32
-1.42
2.35*
-2.64*
2.76*
1.98*
-5.88*
7.23*
3.20*
-2.76*
1.21
-1.95
Data from the National Association for Business Economics, 1998. Standard Deviations in parentheses. T-statistics
test the difference in the means between profit and nonprofit sectors, and '*' indicates that the difference is statisti-
cally significant at a 5% level of significance.
variables are included to control for general and
ftrm-specific productivity, possible gender discrim-
ination, wage variation in job activities, and
regional effects on wages.
The variable of interest is the Moral Satisfaction
variable. Following the method employed in previ-
ous studies, we initially define moral .satisfaction by
the for-profit/nonproftt status of a sector to test
whether salaries differ between for-profit and non-
profit sectors. This defmition leads to sector group-
ings in Columns 1 & 2 of Table 1 and divides the
sample almost in half, with 219 observations falling
into the for-profit group and 221 observations in the
nonprofit group. The authors chose those sectors
that are most likely to lie in the nonprofit sector,
including academic, nonprofit research, govern-
ment, and trade associations. All other categories
were designated to the for-profit sector.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the
entire sample, for-profit and nonprofit sectors. We
see that the business economists in the for-profit
sector eam approximately 38 percent more, on
average, than their counterparts in the nonprofit sec-
tor and that the difference is statistically different
from zero. There does not appear to be a wide dif-
ference in experience patterns. Both sectors have
patterns that initially grow until the third experience
grouping (5-9 years) then rise again until experi-
ence hits the 25-29 year category. Although the dis-
tribution across activities is fairly uniform., a few
distinct patterns are evident. Twenty-five percent of
the sample in the for-profit sector is engaged in
financial-related activities and 11.4 percent of the
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respondents are involved in macro forecasting,
compared to 9 and 3 percent of those in the non-
profit sector, respectively. Additionally, the non-
profit sector economists are more likely than their
for-profit counterparts to teach (17.7 percent versus
1.4 percent). Firm size takes on an unusual pattern
between the two sectors, and business economists
in the nonprofit sector are much more likely to be in
the category representing the largest firms, most
likely due to a govemment affiliation. There are
also differences by region, and business economists
in the profit sector are more often situated in the
North (37 versus 17 percent), while those in the
nonprofit sector are more often situated in the South
(38 versus 22 percent).
While the descriptive statistics indicate a salary
differential between sectors, they do not provide
any information about a possible compensating dif-
ferential. Table 3 presents the regression results for
the salary equation testing for a compensating dif-
ferential. Column (I) presents the regression with-
out any control for moral satisfaction. Column (2)
lists the coefficient estimates when Moral Satisfac-
tion is defined as working in the nonprofit sector.
The regression indicates that the overall model is
adequate in explaining salaries, as indicated by the
adjusted R^  of 0.432 and the statistically significant
F-statistic. In addition, including the control for
Profit increases the explanatory power of the
regression by about six percentage points (the
adjusted R- increases from .371). Note that the
salary regressions contain dummy variables for
occupational activity and region, but because the
coefficient estimates on these variables were gener-
ally not statistically significant, they are not report-
ed in the table. However, the coefficients on occu-
pation activity and region were jointly statistically
significant to the mode! and are retained as con-
The human capital variables are in the direction
expected and indicate that increases in human capi-
tal investment lead to higher average salaries. Econ-
omists with a graduate degree eam 13.2 percent
more on average than economists holding a bache-
lor's degree. Likewise., those with higher experience
eam more on average than those with two years
experience or less (the benchmark category). These
average differences generally grow larger as the
experience level grows. There does not appear to be
any difference in average salary by gender, once
controlling for other factors. Surprisingly, the size
of the firm does not support previous work on this
salary factor. Small firms pay more on average
compared to their larger counterparts, and firms
with at least 5,000 employees eam about 10 percent
less on average than their counterparts in firms with
less than 250 employees.
Regarding moral satisfaction, we see that when
the definition is by profit status, for-profit organiza-
tions pay 28.9 percent more on average than non-
profits. This result is consistent with the 20 percent
differential estimated by Weisbrod (1983) in his
examination of lawyers. Recall that for our sample,
the raw average difference between the salaries for
the two sectors is about 38 percent, suggesting that
the salary differential is only partially explained by
differences in retums to the other independent vari-
ables. The results in Column (2) suggest that econ-
omists in the nonprofit sector pay for their situation
with a lower average salary.
Does the definition of Moral satisfaction
matter?
Defining morally satisfying employment as
working for a nonprofit organization is limiting.
Grouping sectors based solely on whether the sec-
tor is typically nonprofit may not represent what is
perceived as morally satisfying employment. For
example, a Harris Interactive public opinion poll
reveals that only 42 percent of the poll respondents
trust members of Congress and only 37 percent
trust labor union leaders. Since 1977, Gallup has
examined perceptions of honesty among 45 profes-
sions with Congressman, Senators, and labor union
leaders finishing in the bottom third of a recent poll
(39th, 31st, and 30th; respectively).'' Thus, we use
an additional measure of moral satisfaction to test
for a compensating differential.
The moral satisfaction ratings for each of the
employment sectors represented in the NABE data
were derived from a survey distributed to under-
graduates of a large state university and a large
community college taking introductory economics
courses in the Fall of 2001 (N = 249). The one page
survey asked students to rate the level of "moral sat-
isfaction" associated with sixteen employment sec-
tors using a seven point Likert scale, where a "0"
represents "Not at All Morally Satisfying" and a
"7" represents "Very Morally Satisfying."'" Fifteen
employment sectors included on the survey were
selected from those listed on the NABE salary sur-
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TABLE 3.
Salary Regressions (N = 440)'
Constant
Education > 16
Experience (against Exp. < 2 yrs)
Experience 2-4 yrs.
Experience 5-9 yrs.
Experience 10-14 yrs.
Experience 15-19 yrs.
Experience 20-24 yrs.
Experience 25-29 yrs.
Experience 30-34 yrs.
Experience > 35 yrs.-
Feniale
Benchmark
Regression
10.598***
(74.150)
O.IOl***
(2.557)
0.166
(1.143)
0.376***
(2.719)
0.569***
(4.091)
0.714***
(5.167)
0.871***
(6.337)
0.860***
(6.067)
0.810***
(5.335)
0.920***
(5.909)
-0.010
(-0.175)
Firmsize Variahles (against Firms Size 1-249)
Firmsize 250-4999
Firmsize > 5000
Profit Organization
Medium Level Moral satisfaction
Low Level Moral satisfaction
X (Self-Selection)
Adjusted R'
E-Statistic
Log-likelihood
-0.008
(-0.129)
-0.146***
(-2.990)
0.371
10.97***
Profit
10.465***
(75.978)
0.132***
(3.479)
0.168
(I.2I2)
0.441***
(3.345)
0.651***
(4.902)
0.760***
(5.766)
0.925***
(7.058)
0.899***
(6.643)
0.866***
(5.983)
0.976***
(6.491)
-0.028
(-0.520)
-0.089
(-1.539)
-0.106**
(-2.203)
0.289***
(6.622)
0.432
12.53***
Moral Sat.
10.466***
(72.251)
0.129***
(3.262)
0.173
(L209)
0.379***
(2.773)
0.567***
(4.141)
0.718***
(5.261)
0.875***
(6.448)
0.874***
(6.235)
0.844***
(5.637)
0.959***
(6.147)
-0.007
(-0.125)
-0.028
(-0.476)
-0.146***
(-2.926)
0.180***
(3.438)
0.233***
(3.667)
0.393
10.48
Profit
Self-Selection
9.570***
(30.174)
0.276***
(3.217)
0.133
(0.417)
0.678**
(2.223)
0.933***
(3.041)
0.858***
(2.833)
1 ,00***
(3.682)
1.036***
(3.324)
1.167***
(3.544)
1 113***
(3.279)
-0.067
(-0.563)
0.072
(0.989)
-0.016
(-0.250)
1,497***
(8.865)
-0.933***
(-8.835)
177.929***
Moral Sat.
Self-Selection
7.894***
(2.934)
0.360
(1.529)
0.122
(0.078)
0.450
(0.289)
0.517
(0.322)
0.788
(0.503)
0.902
(0.579)
1.091
(0.705)
1.440
(0.904)
0.096
(0.488)
-0.083
(-0.308)
-0.189
(-1.450)
3.172
(1.354)
6.490
(1.380)
-1.802
(-1.407)
-54.039***
' Data from the National Association for Business Economists, 1998. T-statistics in parentheses. Statistical signifi-
cance: *** = O.(X)1: ** = 0.05; * = 0.10. All regressions include controls for occupational activities, which jointly
contribute to the model. The regressions also include controls for region, which jointly contributes to the model
(E-test results available from the authors. A likelihood ratio test is employed with the self-selection model and is
also available from the authors).
- The two highest experience categories are combined in the self-selection model with the moral satisfaction cate-
gories.
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vey and one additional sector, nonprofit charity, was
added to serve as an anchor." Inclusion of the non-
profit charity sector was intended to offer an overt
contrast among the sectors. Specifically, the expec-
tation was Ihat moral responsibility scores would be
highest for this sector thus creating an "anchor"
against which all remaining sector would be ranked.
Moral satisfaction was defined as the extent to
which work in various industry sectors may reflect
a desire to help others. Frank (1996) defines moral
satisfaction as "people's concem about others" (p.
2). We depart from the Frank (1996) definition
because the raters are asked to reflect on a more
broadly defined sector rather than a firm as in
Frank. As noted earlier, we kept the evaluation at
the sector level as opposed to the individual firm
level under the assumption that an economist can
work in any sector with his particular skill set. We
think that our definition is representative of Frank's
(1996) definition yet sufficiently distinct to main-
tain the desired level of evaluation by the rater. A
copy of the survey instrument is included in Appen-
dix 1. Moral satisfaction scores are reported in
Appendix 2.
The average age of respondents was 22 and 53%
percent of the sample was female. On average, the
sample had 4.5 years of work experience, and 2.1
years of full-time work experience.'- We employed
exploratory factor analysis to uncover the underly-
ing structure of the ratings. The factor analysis gen-
erated three groups for the NABE industry sectors
based on factor loadings, which we identified as
low, medium, and high moral satisfaction." These
factors were subsequently used in the regression
analysis. Turning to Table 3, Column (3), we find
that individuals employed in sectors rated low in
moral satisfaction receive 23.3 percent and 18 per-
cent higher salary on average compared to their
counterparts in high and medium level moral satis-
faction employment, respectively. This result com-
pares favorably with our first regression and other
studies that employ the for-profit/nonprofit sector
analysis. Frank (1996) found that individuals in the
"most socially responsible" employment earned
salaries that were 30% lower than those in "average
socially responsible" employment. Individuals in
"least socially responsible" employment earned
14% more than those in "average socially responsi-
ble" employment.'^
SelfSelection: An Additional Test for the
Compensating Differential
Are individuals choosing lower salaries to be in
employment that tends to pay less for higher moral
satisfaction or do individuals select the nonprofit
sector because they expect to do less well in the for-
profit sector? Hedonic price theory indicates a
tradeoff, but perhaps the "choice" is very different
for those economists who are ultimately in the for-
profit sectors compared to those in the nonprofit
sector. In his examination of lawyers, Goddeeris
(1988) makes the argument that perhaps public sec-
tor lawyers choose the public sector because that is
where their comparative advantage lies—if they
chose the private sector, they would actually eam
lower salaries than in their current public sector law
employment.
If this is the case, then the model must include a
self-selection correction as defined by Heckman
(1979). In this case, we observe all observations;
however, underlying the model is the notion that
choices into the for-profit and nonprofit sectors are
made after some decision threshold is crossed. If so,
the control for moral satisfaction in the OLS salary
regression will be correlated with the error term and
result in inconsistent parameter estimates. Using
for-profit/nonprofit status as representative of moral
satisfaction, the model becomes:
Ln salary- ^^+ ^frofit + ^firad. Deg. +
2t Female +^Q Experience +
2 P Firmsize -i- X 3 Occupational
Activity^ + S 3 Region^^ •¥ £
Profit* = a^ j -1- a^Salaiy Difference + (2)
oLprad. Deg. + a^Female +
S a Experience + TI
Profit = J if Profit* > 0 and Profit =
0 if Profit* < 0.
In the model above, the decision threshold. Profit*.
is not observed; however, once an individual cross-
es the threshold, they select the for-proftt sector.
Using the indicator variable. Profit, we can estimate
the probability that an individual selects one sector
or another, then control for the selection process in
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the salary regression to provide consistent coeffi-
cient estimates.
The probability that an individual selects into the
for-profit sector is estimated with a probit regres-
sion. Human capital variables and a control for gen-
der are included in the model, as are two additional
variables. The probit model includes the variable
Salary Difference. The difference in actual and
expected salary captures whether individuals
choose a sector because they receive a comparative
advantage in that sector. Using a modified form of
Equation (1),'- we estimate salary regressions for
the each sector, take the antilog of the estimated log
salary an individual would expect if paid in his or
her alternative sector, and subtract that estimate
from each individual's actual salary. As noted in
Table 2, the average difference is $24,011 lower for
those in the nonprofit sector, but $18,807 higher for
those in the for-profit sector. In other words, econo-
mists working in the nonprofit sector would receive
a much higher salary if they were paid the same
retums to the included variables as their for-profit
counterparts. On the other hand, for-profit econo-
mists would be paid a much lower salary for their
same level of education, experience, gender, and
firm type in the nonprofit sector.
As it is not the regression of interest here, the
probit regression results are in Appendix 3. The
model adequately predicts the probability that an
individual will be situated in the for-profit sector, as
noted by the likelihood ratio test on the overall
model and the nearly 70 percent correct predictions.
As expected, a positive gap between the actual and
expected salary increases the probability that an
economist will be situated in the for-profit sector;
for every $1,000 increase in the gap, the probabili-
ty that an individual will be in the for-profjt sector
increases by 0.213, or 21.3 percentage points. This
estimate, while small, is similar to Weisbrod's
(1983) coefficient estimate of 0.18 for his expected
eamings difference variable. A graduate degree
reduces the probability that an individual will be sit-
uated in the for-profit sector by almost 14 percent-
age points, which is not surprising, given the edu-
cational requirements for research and teaching in
the nonprofit sector. The gender variable has little
effect. Finally, although the coefficients on the
experience variables are not statistically significant,
they are generally negative, suggesting that increas-
es in firm experience lower the average probability
that an individual will be situated in the for-profit
sector.
When we include self-selection in the salary
regression, we find that the coefficient on Profit
rises to 1.497 (Table 3, Column 4), suggesting that
economists in the for-profit sector eam 150 percent
more on average than their nonprofit counterparts,
once controlling for the choice of sector. This figure
is nearly three times as large as the estimate of 56%
by Goddeeris (1988). The statistically significant
coefficient on the Heckman's selection correction
(\) indicates that self-selection is an important fac-
tor in economists' choices. The negative sign, in
conjunction with the average difference between
actual and expected salary, suggest that those in the
for-profit sector make a selection due in part to
comparative advantage.
To estimate self-selection with the three moral
satisfaction categories, we employ an ordered pro-
bit:
Ln salary.= p^ +^ ^^Medium Moral Satisfaction +
^,Low Moral Satisfaction +
^prad. Deg. + ^female^ +
X^Experience + Xp Firmsize. +
2 3 Occupational Activity. +
X S Region + E
z* = a^^+ a^Salary Difference^ +
ajGrad. Deg.-\- a^
% a Experience (3)
< z * < 0
1 if 0 < z* < |x
2 if (X < z* < + OO
where |JL is the threshold parameter to distinguish
the ranking of the categories. Because we desire to
retain the benchmark category in the salary regres-
sion as "high moral satisfaction." 0 is associated
with individuals situated in employment with high
moral satisfaction, I with medium and 2 with low
moral satisfaction. Slight changes were made in the
experience and occupational activity categories
because too few observations fell into these cate-
gories.'" To calculate Salary Difference, we used
separate regressions for each category, as with the
profit/nonprofit model. In this case, the high moral
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satisfaction coefficients measure expected salary
for the other two categories; the low moral satisfac-
tion category coefficients are used to measure
expected salary for the high moral satisfaction
group. Corrected asymptotic standard errors were
used to calculate the relevant t-statistics.
The last column of Table 3 presents the self-
selection coefficients for the salary model using the
three moral satisfaction categories. Although the
coefficients are not generally statistically signifi-
cant, they follow the same pattem as in the previous
model. Both of the coefficients on the moral satis-
faction variables grow substantially and retain the
rank order depicted in the OLS regression, and the
coefficient on the self-selection variable remains
negative. While these results are not definitive, they
do lend further support to the notion that individu-
als tradeoff salary for employment in sectors
deemed morally satisfying.'^
IV. Conclusion
Our findings suggest that a sample of business
economists working in the nonprofit sector receive
a lower average salary than their for-profit counter-
parts. It appears as though a large part of this effect
is due to self-selection into one of the two sectors.
In fact, once we control for self-selection, the dif-
ference in average salaries between for-profit and
nonprofit economists rises to 150 percent, com-
pared to only 28.9 percent.
Does the difference represent a compensating
differential for selecting morally satisfying employ-
ment? As noted above, estimated average wages
were higher for those economists situated in the low
and medium moral satisfaction sector compared to
those in the high moral satisfaction sector. If our
groupings are valid, this result suggests a compen-
sating differential story for moral satisfaction. How-
ever, we are cautious in this interpretation because
those making the employment choices are not the
individuals providing their perceptions of moral sat-
isfaction. Ideally, the moral satisfaction ratings
would be provided by the individuals evaluating
employment opportunities. Unfortunately, no such
data exist at this time to test the moral satisfaction
story with this level of precision.
We do see a story for a moral satisfaction-salary
tradeoff. Like Gooderris (1988), we find that self-
selection affects the gap between for-profit and
nonprofit sectors. This result may represent a moral
satisfaction-salary tradeoff, but it may also repre-
sent other nonpecuniary benefits such as autonomy,
challenging work, and variety identified by Mirvis
and Hackett (1983) as contributing factors to
greater job satisfaction in the nonprofit sector. It is
when we incorporate industry ratings of moral sat-
isfaction that wage differentials and the tradeoff
appears more evident.
Not altogether surprising, our effort to explore
the intriguing finding presented by Frank (1996)
has generated more questions for further study.
Using a dataset of well-paid and well-educated
business economists, we find evidence of a com-
pensating differential in which business economists
trade salary for morally satisfying work. We do not
pretend that this dataset is representative of the pop-
ulation at-large; however, the results of our study do
extend the literature while raising questions for fur-
ther study. In particular, how does the type of grad-
uate education contribute to the decision to trade
salary for morally satisfying employment? Why do
we see a 150% trade-off among economists yet only
56% among lawyers? What might the results be for
medical doctors, chemists, or computer scientists?
The answer to these and related questions potential-
ly affect business decisions and public policy
regarding graduate education and government
employment.
APPENDIX 1
Ratings Survey
Instructions
For each of the major employment sectors listed below, please indicate how morally satisfying you
believe the work to be. By morally satisfying, please consider to what extent work in the sector may
reflect an individual employee's concem for the interest of others. For each sector listed below, choose a
value between one and seven with one meaning: Not At All Morally Satisfying and seven meaning
Extremely Morally Satisfying.
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Employment
Sector
Manufacturing
Retail and Wholesale Trade
Securities and Investments
Financial Institutions
Insurance
Communications
Utilities
Publishing
Transportation
Mining
Construction
Non-profit Research
Trade Association
Government
Academic
Non-profit Charity
Noi
Morally
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
al all
Satisfying
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Extremely
Morall)
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
' Satisfying
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
You arc reminded that this survey will be kept confidential and there i.s no way to link the survey to an individual
respondent. Below are a tew more questions for you to answer.
How old are you?
What is your gender? Male Female
How many years have you been working?
How many years have you worked full-time (35+ hrs./week)?
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. Once tabulated, the results will be shared with you.
APPENDIX 2.
Descriptive Statistics—Moral Satisfaction Ratings
sector N' missing mean sd
5
2
1
3
1
2
0
9
1
1
1
2
1
2
5
->
' The Communications and Utiliiies sector were combined on the salary survey so salary surveys from these sectors
could not be matched with the Moral Satisfaction ratings. The nine salary surveys indicating the individuals worked
in these sectors where removed from the dataset.
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Academic
Communications'
Construction-
Financial Institutions
Government
Insurance
Manufacturing
Mining-
Nonprofit Charity'
Nonprofit Research
Publishing
Retail and Wholesale Trade
Securities & Investments
Trade Association
Transportation
Utilities'
244
247
248
246
248
247
249
240
248
248
248
247
248
247
244
247
5.713
4.751
3.927
4.557
4.635
4.069
3.719
2.923
5.472
4.851
4.440
3.988
4.504
4.194
4.123
3.927
1.308
1.443
1.785
1.524
1.626
1.665
1.535
1.529
1.808
1.861
1.469
1.464
1.511
1.409
1.719
1.531
^ No salary survey respondents identified themselves as employed in the Mining or Construction sectors and these
sectors were subsequently dropped frotn the analysis.
' The Nonprofit Charity sector was not included on the salary survey but rather added to the ratings survey to serve
as an anchor. It was expected that this sector would receive high ratings for Moral Satisfaction compared to the
other sectors.
* N represents the number of undergraduate students who completed the survey questions about moral satisfaction
where the total number of students was 249.
APPENDIX 3.
Probit Analysis'
Constant
Actual-Expected Earnings
(thousands)
Education > 16
Experience 2-4 yrs.
Experience 5-9 yrs.
Experience 10-14 yrs.
Experience 15-19 yrs.
Experience 20-24 yrs.
Experience 25-29 yrs.
Experience 30-34 yrs.
Experience > 35 yrs.'
Female
Log-Likelihood
Percent Correctly Predicted
Profit
0.621
(1.420)
0.018***
(8.833)
-0.382***
(-2.750)
-O.047
(0.096)
-0.506
(-1.102)
-0.564
(-1.216)
-0.234
(-0.504)
-0.383
(-0.821)
-0.252
(-0.528)
-0.354
(-0.651)
-0.082
(-0.149)
-0.003
(-0.016)
-243.273***
69.77%
Marginal Effect
0.213
-0,141
0.016
-0.190
-0.213
-0.084
-0.141
-0.091
-0.127
-0.028
-0.001
Moral Sat.
1.405***
(4.496)
0.005***
(5.071)
-0.262**
(-2.257)
-0.247
(-0.684)
-0.276
(-0.798)
-0.039
(-0.116)
-0.353
(-1.043)
-0.273
(0.807)
-0.568
(-1.618)
-0.839
(-2.395)
-0.185
(-1.051)
^02.068***
57.5%
Marginal Effect-
0.107
-0.095
-0.090
-0.099
-0.015
-0.128
-0.098
-0.188
-0.253
-0.068
' T-statistics in parentheses. Level of significance: *** = .01, ** = .05, * = .1. Marginal effects are estimated from
the base case that begins with the average difference in earnings and sets all dummy variables to zero. The earnings
difference variable is increased by one standard deviation to calculate the change from the base case probability; the
dummy variables are individually set to one to calculate the change in the base probability for each variable.
- Marginal effects are calculated for the probability of being in the lowest moral satisfaction
category (most like the for-profit category in the binary probit). Marginal effects for the other two categories are
available from the authors.
' The two large.st experience categories were combined together because no one in the high moral satisfaction cate-
gory was situated in the highest level experience category.
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Notes
1. Because we use a highly specialized set of
workers (economists), the use of sectors works
for us. Wiih other types of workers, however,
occupational choice may be more useful. For
example, low-skilled workers may make occu-
pational choices based on legal and illegal
activities because the latter are morally repre-
hensible to them.
2. For a review of the wage/risk tradeoff research,
.see Viscusi (1993).
3. A growing literature suggests that mental atti-
tude is superior to materialist conceptions as a
predictor of happiness. Mihaly Csikszentmiha-
lyi (1999) focuses on the flow experience, one
dimension of happiness, resulting from
involvement and complete concentration on an
activity like an occupation, for example.
4. We are unable to find any empirical tests of the
theory, however anecdotal evidence can fre-
quently be found in newspapers. S. Vaughn
(2001) quotes Eileen Heisman, President ofthe
National Philanthropic Trust, "People have
always said I could make a lot of money with
my skill set in the corporate world. But I have a
huge amount of job satisfaction and no cogni-
tive dissonance about what I do at work and
who I am at home." Although Ms. Heisman's
compensation is not revealed, it seems clear
that she is consciously foregoing higher com-
pensation in exchange for employment-related
and lifestyle-related benefits.
5. To ensure that a 2 from one rater is the same as
a 2 from another rater. Frank (1996) uses a
deviation from the mean approach which fails
to account for variation in moral satisfaction
ratings. In the case of this study, the results are
identical regardless of which approach is
employed.
6. Of the 771 returned surveys, 209 had to be
removed from the sample due to missing data,
5S had to be removed because the sector was
coded as "other" thus unusable, and 9 had to be
removed because the survey grouped three
"sectors" which we cannot separate to match
with moral responsibility scores. Forty-three
additional surveys were eliminated due to miss-
ing data for the variables used in the regression
analysis. Finally, we lose 11 due to missing
data for the self-selection variables.
7. The individual may or may not have a graduate
degree in economics. For example, some indi-
viduals may have an MBA or other profession-
al degree. The data do not indicate the details of
each person's area of study.
8. A restricted F-test indicates that the occupa-
tional activity coefficients were jointly signifi-
cant to the model. For the regional coefficients,
only the coefficient associated with the Central
region was statistically significant, and only for
the profit/nonprofit model. In all cases, howev-
er, a restricted F-test indicated that region was
jointed significant to the model. Details avail-
able from the authors.
9. The Harris Interactive poll results were includ-
ed as part of an article titled, "Teachers second
most respected profession," in the Idaho Edu-
cation Association Reporter, Fall 2001 (Volume
56, number I). Leslie McAneny of Gallup
News Service wrote the press release titled,
"Nurses Displace Pharmacists at Top of
Expanded Honesty and Ethics Poll." dated
November 16. 1999.
10. Following the collection of moral satisfaction
rating scores, an advanced undergraduate stu-
dent conducted a focus group to explore student
understanding of the definition of moral satis-
faction and student understanding of the sur-
vey. The findings from the focus group suggest
that students understand the definition and the
survey instrument.
11. Moral Satisfaction ratings were collected for
the 15 sectors listed on the NABE salary sur-
vey. Table 1 reflects only 11 sectors because
four sectors were eliminated when unusable
salary surveys were eliminated. See Endnote 5.
12. Some may view the relatively young age ofthe
sample as a disadvantaged in assessing moral
satisfaction. To others, their youth is beneficial
in that these respondents are rating the sectors
without knowing information about salaries or
other job attributes. Their responses, therefore,
are more likely to be focused only on the ques-
tion at hand, "what is a morally satisfying sec-
tor of employment?"
13. Factor analysis results can be obtained from the
authors.
14. Frank used the middle category "average social
responsibility" as the benchmark category in
salary regressions.
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15. The nonprofit sector does not have individuals
working in the two categories representing the
largest firms and they were therefore deducted
from the analysis. The other variables as in Col-
umn (t) of Table 4 were used for the separate
regressions.
16. Consulting and corporate planning were com-
bined together because those in the high moral
satisfaction categories did not have corporate
planning as an activity. The two largest experi-
ence categories were combined together
because those in the high moral satisfaction
group did not have experience beyond 34 years.
17. The ordered probit does not pertbrm as well as
the binary probit and therefore leads to coeffi-
cient estimates that are less precise.
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